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I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2003, a Pandora's Box of controversy was opened which has
yet to be closed.' The U.S. Anti-Doping Agency received a package from an
anonymous track and field coach containing a used syringe. 2 After testing,
the syringe was found to contain a hybrid steroid cocktail that was previously
not detectable by drug-testing procedures.3 The anonymous coach claimed
the steroid 4 was being supplied to athletes by Victor Conte, president of the
Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative ("BALCO").5 This information prompted
an investigation into BALCO by the Department of Justice and the Internal
Revenue Service, 6 which, coupled with the release of former professional
baseball player Jose Conseco's book Juiced,7 exposed several high-profile
* Note & Comment Editor, Ohio State Law Journal; J.D., The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law, expected 2008. Much thanks to all my friends who volunteered
(or who were forced) to endlessly read over the many drafts of this Note; especially
Keila, who was the only person to read an entire draft. Also, thanks to my parents for
teaching me I could do anything I put my mind to, including getting a sports article
published as a law review article. Lastly, I would like to thank Rob for giving me plenty
of reasons not to work on this Note and thus allowing me to keep my sanity.
I Though the use of steroids has a long history in many different sports, see Maxwell
J. Mehlman, Elizabeth Banger, & Matthew M. Wright, Doping in Sports and the Use of
State Power, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 15, 17-21 (2005), this Note will deal exclusively with
the recent steroids scandal plaguing MLB and the NFL.
2 See Mark Zeigler, Anatomy of a Drug Investigation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB.,
Nov. 2, 2003, at C7.
3 See id.
4 For purposes of this Note and unless otherwise specified, the term steroid is meant
to include anabolic-androgenic steroids and nutritional supplements that have or may
have the same effect as steroids.
5 See Zeigler, supra note 2; see also Jeffrey Kluger, The Steroid Detective, TIME,
Mar. 1, 2004, at 60.
6 See David K. Osei, Note, Doping, Juicing, and Executive Bypass Oversight: A
Case Study of Major League Baseball's Steroid Scandal, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 155,
156-57 (2004).
7 See Countdown (MSNBC television broadcast Feb. 14, 2005) (stating that Conseco
pegged Mark McGwire, Jason Giambi, Juan Gonzalez, Rafael Palmeiro, and Ivan
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athletes to public scrutiny and criminal and congressional questioning
regarding possible steroid use.8 Major League Baseball ("MLB") has seen
former heroes such as Jason Giambi, Jeremy Giambi, and Gary Sheffield
haled before grand juries,9 while Congress has taken testimony from Rafael
Palmeiro, Jose Conseco, and home-run king Mark McGwire.' 0 Potential Hall
of Famer Barry Bonds has been in the middle of the controversy as well,
serving as a link between many other players and BALCO.II The National
Football League ("NFL") also saw players brought before grand juries to
testify about steroid use, including four former Oakland Raiders: Bill
Romanowski, Barret Robbins, Chris Copper, and Dana Stubblefield. 12
In 2006, both MLB and the NFL garnered more press coverage, bringing
steroid usage back to the forefront. MLB Hall of Fame ballots baring the
name of McGwire prompted a serious debate as to whether or not possible
steroid use should bar induction of an otherwise likely Hall of Famer.13
The NFL saw two steroids stories break, confirming that the problem
with steroids is not only an MLB problem. 14 San Diego Chargers linebacker
Rodriguez, as well as others, as steroid users); see also Baird Helgeson, Committee
Passes Statewide Testing for Use of Steroids, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 31, 2005, Metro, at 1
(noting that, in Juiced, Conseco claimed to have used steroids and injected Mark
McGwire with steroids).
8 See Ian Bishop & Bill Sanderson, Home-Run Hero Bats a Big Zero: McGwire
Refuses to Come Clean, N.Y. POST, Mar. 18, 2005, at 6; Helgeson, supra note 7.
9 See John Crumpacker & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Sports and Drugs: Star-Studded Day
for the Grand Jury, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 12, 2003, at C1.
10 See Bishop & Sanderson, supra note 8.
11 See Crumpacker & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 9.
12 Id
13 See Rick Hummel, Lost in the Shadow, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 4, 2007, at
D1 (observing that there was "more buzz" about McGwire not getting into the Hall of
Fame than about Tony Gwynn and Cal Ripken, Jr. being voted in); Michael Hunt, A
Certain Hall of Fame Ballot Won't Have McGwire's Name Checked, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Dec. 3, 2006, at CI (noting that, though McGwire has outstanding statistics,
seventy-five percent of Hall of Fame voters have stated they will not vote for McGwire);
Tony Massarotti, Covering All Bases; Goin' Out with a Bang, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 31,
2006, at B33 (stating that, due to steroid use, McGwire is "not getting in this time and he
may not get in ever").
Though he has not tested positive for steroids, Barry Bonds was reported to have
failed a test for amphetamines, a performance-enhancing drug prohibited by MLB's
"Program," explained infra Part II.B. See T.J. Quinn with Bill Madden, Failure Leaves a
Testy Bany, Passes Blame to Teammate, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 11, 2007, at 57.
Though not the focus of this Note, there are many substances besides steroids that are
prohibited by both MLB and the NFL. See infra notes 44, 76 (providing sources for
complete lists of prohibited substances).
14 See generally Phil Taylor, Seeing is Believing: There's Cheating in All Pro
Sports-If You Look Closely, SI.COM, Oct. 25, 2006, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
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sensation Shawne Merriman, former Rookie Defensive Player of the Year
and candidate for Defensive Player of the Year in 2006, tested positive in
October for steroids.15 Perhaps more shocking was the news coverage over
the non-detected steroid use by the 2003 National Football Conference
Champion Carolina Panthers. James Shortt, a South Carolina doctor, pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to distribute steroids and human growth hormone
("HGH") to Panthers players. 16 Evidence was produced showing that five
players extensively used steroids during the 2002 season, 17 but the NFL did
not detect the use. 18 This egregious mistake by the NFL may lead to a new
round of congressional investigations into doping in professional sports now
that Democrats have retaken control of the House of Representatives. 19
The summer of 2007 saw more steroid stories break. HGH took center
stage, as MLB Commissioner Bud Selig admitted that his sport could not
control use of the illegal drug. 20 The NFL suspended player Rodney Harrison
of the New England Patriots, a fourteen-year veteran, for four games after he
admitted to using HGH to prosecutors who linked him to a clinic supplying
HGH. 21 That same investigation led to a five-game suspension for Dallas
Cowboy quarterbacks coach Wade Wilson when an order he placed with the
clinic was discovered.22 The same investigation has also linked MLB player
Rick Ankiel to HGH use. 23 It appears this investigation will uncover more
MLB and NFL player use.24
The release of the Mitchell Report in December 2007 illustrated just how
widespread steroid use, specifically HGH use, is in major league baseball and
2006/writers/phil taylor/10/25/merriman/index.html (noting that steroids are likely as big
a problem in the NFL as in the MLB, though the NFL receives less media coverage on
the matter).
IS See id.
16 See Evan Weiner, Incoming Congress May Tackle Several Sports Issues, N.Y.
SUN, Jan. 4, 2007, at 18.
17 See Taylor, supra note 14.
18 See Weiner, supra note 16.
19 See id. (noting that Rep. Henry Waxman, a Democrat from California and new
chair of the House Committee on Government Reform, indicated in late summer 2006
that he was interested in beginning a new round of congressional hearings).
20 See Mike Berardino, Selig's Struggling in his Quest to Corral HGH, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, July 14, 2007, at Sports.
21 See Brendan J. Lyons, Steroids Raid Still Reverberating: Six Months After
Florida Arrests, Probe Snares Pro Athletes, Nets Cash Seizures, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), Sept. 17, 2007, at Al.
22 Id.
23 See T.J. Quinn, Baseball Wants Names; Offers to Help Drug Probe if it Can Get
Names Before Media, TIMEs UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 11, 2007 at B 1.
24 See id.
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how detrimental public knowledge of such use is to a player's career. The
Report, commissioned by Commissioner Selig, stated that Andy Pettitte and
future Hall-of-Famer Roger Clemens both used HGH during their careers.25
Both players are pitchers, 26 demonstrating that steroid use is not limited to
power hitters. After the report was released, Pettitte admitted using HGH in
both 2002 and 2004.27 Clemens denied the allegation, leading to a
Congressional hearing and a perjury investigation by the FBI.28 Clemens is
quickly becoming "baseball's scarlet letter"29-his "personal services
contract" with the Houston Astros30 and his future hall-of-fame status may be
in danger.3 '
Both the NFL and MLB have offered to help identify players who have
ordered illegal steroids from the Florida clinic, 32 but this willingness to
ferret-out HGH use may be only a fagade. Though both organizations stated
publicly that they are interested in preventing HGH use, prevention will only
be possible only with an HGH test.33 Previously, there was no test for HGH;
however, a new blood test should be ready to be used by the end of 2007. 34
One would think that such a test would be warmly embraced by
organizations that are committed to cleaning up their sports. That does not
25 See Bob Hohler, A Long, Star-Studded Drug Roster: Enhancement Use Tainted
All Teams, Sweeping Report Says 'Steroids era'Blamed on a Collective Failure, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2007, at Al.
26 See id.
27 See Mark Feinsand, Andy Situation is a No-Win, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 29,
2008, at 74.
28 See id. The evidence of Clemens' steroid use in the Mitchell Report comes from
the testimony of Clemens' former trainer, Brian McNamee. See Hohler, supra note 25.
McNamee claimed to have injected Clemens with HGH himself. See Substance Abuse
and Perjury; Dark Cloud over Roger Clemens Reminds That Perjury Is a Serious
Charge, MORNING CALL, Mar. 4, 2008, at A12. After Clemens denied use, Andy Pettitte,
a good friend of Clemens, stated in a deposition that Clemens admitted to Pettitte that he
used HGH. See Feinsand, supra note 27. Clemens claims that Pettitte "misremembered"
the event. Id. Pettitte will likely be "dragged into" the pending FBI investigation in
Clemens. Id.
29 See Christian Red, Suddenly, Rocket Launches Self Home, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
Mar. 1, 2008, at 46.
30 See id. (reporting that, though Astros owner Drayton McLane currently states he
will "honor the [personal services] contract," Clemens' absence from the Astros' minor-
league complex suggests that the Astros are "distancing themselves" from Clemens).
31 See Hohler, supra note 25 (stressing that Mark McGuire was not admitted to the
Hall of Fame "amid suspicion of steroid use" and that Clemens may face a similar fate).
32 See Quinn supra, note 23.
33 See Mike Reiss, HGH Isn't Put to the Test: WADA Official Takes Issue with NFL
Stance, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2007, at C6.
34 Id.
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appear to be the case. The NFL and the NFL Players' Association have
already stated that they will not use a blood test.35 Commissioner Roger
Goodell hasstated that "players don't feel strongly enough about" HGH to
submit to blood testing.36 It appears that the new great steroid threat will not
be willingly combated by professional sports organizations. The use of
steroids by professional athletes not only raises issues regarding the integrity
of sports or the health of athletes, it also has ramifications for the youth of
America. Congressional findings have shown that the use of steroids is
escalating in high school as well, with the role-model status of professional
athletes influencing use among America's children. 37 Even President Bush,
in his 2004 State of the Union Address, spoke to the effect of professional
athlete use of steroids on children:
To help children make right choices, they need good examples. Athletics
play such an important role in our society, but, unfortunately, some in
professional sports are not setting much of an example. The use of
performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and other
sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong message-that there are
shortcuts to accomplishment, and that performance is more important than
character. 38
The issue has made professional steroid use relevant not only to sports
fans and supporters, but also to those looking out for the well being of
children.
The possibility of new congressional action39 on this matter is the central
focus of this Note. Should Congress be involved in the steroid controversy?
If Congress does indeed attempt to help stem the tide of drug use in
professional sports, what can Congress constitutionally do? More
specifically, can Congress mandate a drug-testing scheme that would be
more successful than the steroid-testing policies already in place in MLB and
the NFL and, if so, would such a policy violate the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures? Part II of this Note
35 Id.
36 Id. As explained in Part III, infra, players have incentives to keep drug testing to a
minimum. The lack of satisfactory drug-testing policies in MLB and the NFL can be
partially attributed to player opposition to specific types of testing. See infra Part II.
37 See Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); see also infra
notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
38 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
39 Congress's ability to intervene in this matter and mandate testing requirements
stems from its power under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See
Matthew J. Mitten, Drug Testing of Athletes-An Internal, Not External, Matter, 40 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 797, 805 (2006).
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provides an overview of the current drug-testing policies of MLB and the
NFL. Part III explores incentives on both sides of the collective bargaining
table 40 that lead to weak steroid-testing policies Part III also addresses
whether Congress is in a better position to mandate tough policies, and
concludes that Congress should intervene. Part IV tackles the complex
question of the constitutionality of such congressional intervention by
reviewing the jurisprudence of the "special needs" doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment and applying it to the current steroid issue, using the Clean
Sports Act of 2005 and the Drug Free Sports Act as examples. Part IV
concludes that congressionally-mandated steroid testing would be
unconstitutional. Part V then recommends a possible strategy for Congress to
reduce doping in professional sports and among the youth of America,
concluding that Congress should focus its efforts on increased testing and
education of middle and high school students-something that can be done
constitutionally-while offering tax incentives to professional sports
organizations and owners in order to incentivize this side of the bargaining
table to fight for tougher policies.
II. CURRENT DRUG-TESTING POLICIES OF MLB AND THE NFL
A. NFL Steroid Testing Policies
In 1987, the NFL was the first professional sports organization to initiate
a drug-testing program.41 Actual testing began in 1989, with the current
program beginning in 1993.42 This program is regarded as the most extensive
and comprehensive in major American professional sports. 43 The NFL
instituted the program for three reasons: 1) steroids and other substances
threaten the integrity and fairness of professional football; 2) steroids have
adverse health effects; and 3) the use of steroids by professional athletes
sends a negative message to the youth of America. 44 No NFL player is
40 Both MLB and the NFL are unionized organizations that follow collective
bargaining agreements. See Lisa Pike Masteralexis, Drug Testing Provisions: An
Examination of Disparities in Rules and Collective Bargaining Agreement Provisions, 40
NEW ENG. L. REv. 775, 775-76 (2006).
41 See id at 780.
42 See Interview with General Counsel Adolpho Birch on the NFL's Drug Policy, 5
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc., Winter 2002, at 6.
43 See Allan H. "Bud" Selig & Robert D. Manfred, Jr., The Regulation of Nutritional
Supplements in Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 35, 54 (2004) ("The NFL
has the most comprehensive drug-testing policy of the four major sports.").
44NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, POLICY ON ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND RELATED
SUBSTANCES 1-2 (2007) (hereinafter NFL POLICY), available at http://www.nflpa.org/
pdfs/RulesAndRegs/BannedSubstances.pdf.
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allowed to use any anabolic-androgenic steroid,45 human or animal growth
hormone, listed stimulant, or other similar substance.46 The text below
outlines the process by which players are tested for such substances.
1. Administration of Testing
The NFL steroid-testing program is directed by the NFL Advisor on
Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances ("Advisor") who has "sole
discretion to make determinations regarding steroid-related matters,
including ... testing."47 The Advisor also has the duty of making himself
available to players and team doctors for consultations and to ensure that
education on steroid issues is being developed. 48 All testing is done by urine
analysis.49 The sample is given under observation, and players are not
informed until the day of the test that they will be tested.50
2. Circumstances That Permit Testing
The NFL has six types of steroid testing: "pre-employment,"
"annual/preseason," "regular season," "postseason," "off-season," and
"reasonable cause testing for players with prior positive tests or under other
circumstances" ("reasonable cause"). 51 "Pre-employment" testing may be
done on free agents, both rookies and veterans, and any player who is eligible
for the NFL draft. 52 "Annual/preseason" testing is done on all players at least
once a season, during training camp, or when the player reports to his
45 An anabolic steroid is defined as: "any of a group of usually synthetic hormones
that are derivatives of testosterone, are used medically especially to promote tissue
growth, and are sometimes abused by athletes to increase the size and strength of their
muscles and improve endurance." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.webster.com/dictionary/anabolicsteroid (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
46 Paul A. Fortenberry & Brian E. Hoffman, Illegal Muscle: A Comparative Analysis
of Proposed Steroid Legislation and the Policies in Professional Sports' CBAs that Led to
the Steroid Controversy, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 123 (2006). For a complete list
all of all substances banned by the NFL, see NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 13-16.
47 NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 2.
48 Id. The Advisor is also required to "participate in research on steroids; confer with
the Consulting Toxicologist; and serve on the League's Advisory Committee on Anabolic
Steroids and Related Substances." Id. at 2-3.
49Id at3.
50 Id at 4 (referring to the collecting of urine samples for analysis).
5 1 Id. at 3-4.
52 Id. at 3 ("Pre-employment tests may be administered to free agent players
(whether rookies or veterans). In addition, the League will conduct tests at its annual
timing and testing sessions for draft-eligible football players.").
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respective team.53 Random testing of players during the weeks of preseason
games also falls under this type of testing. 54 "Regular season" tests include
testing players from each team randomly selected by the Advisor using a
computer program.55 There is no cap on the number of times the same player
may be randomly selected for this testing and no guarantee that all players
will at some point be randomly tested.56 "Postseason" tests are an extension
of the random testing system used in the regular season, but it only applies to
teams that are participating in the postseason and only until a team is
eliminated from the postseason. 57 Under "off-season" testing, the Advisor
can choose to test up to six times from a pool of all players who are currently
under contract. 58 Players are chosen for testing in the same random way test
subjects are chosen for "regular season" testing. 59
"Reasonable cause" testing, the most extensive form of testing in the
NFL, allows the Advisor to test a player who has a history of steroid use in
college or the pros as often as the Advisor sees fit, both during the season
and the off-season.60 It also allows for the testing of players when the
Advisor has information that causes him to reasonably suspect a player of
steroid use.61 A team may require a player to undergo "reasonable cause"
testing if both the team physician and the Advisor agree that the course of
action is appropriate. 62
53 NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 3.
54 Id. ("[R]andom testing will be conducted during the weeks in which preseason
games are played.").
55 See id.
56 See id. at 3-4 (stressing that players can be tested an unlimited amount of times,
but not requiring that all players be tested in this manner a minimum number of times
during a season). Note that players who are subject to the reasonable cause testing are not
subject to random testing of "regular season," "postseason," or "off-season" testing. Id. at
4.
57 Id. at4.
58 Id.
59 NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 4.
60 Id. This includes players who have ever tested positive during college, combines,
or their pro careers. Id.
61 Id
62 Id. at 11.
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3. Procedures and Penalties for Positive Test Results63
After a player tests positive, 64 the player and the League Office are
notified and a second test, or "B" test, is performed on the remaining urine. 65
If this sample tests positive, the player is said to have a confirmed positive
steroid test.66 All confirmed positive test results are subject to penalties by
the NFL67 that vary depending on how many times a player has tested
positive.68
The first positive test leads to a minimum four-game suspension, without
pay, starting from a date designated by the NFL.69 A second positive test
warrants a minimum eight-game suspension without pay.70 A third positive
result lands a player a minimum twelve-month suspension without pay. 71 In
order to play after a third suspension, a player must petition the
Commissioner of the NFL for reinstatement. 72 The Commissioner has the
sole discretion to reinstate a player and determine the conditions under which
that player can return to the NFL. 73 During all suspensions, a player cannot
use team facilities, have contact with team officials, or participate in team
activities.74 At the end of any suspension period, a player must test negative
63 Included in the NFL plan are procedures and conditions for reinstatement dealing
with medical treatment for players in certain situations. See generally id. at 6-9. This
aspect of the policy is not covered in this Note.
64 Penalties can also be instituted for missing a test date unexcused, attempting to
manipulate a test sample, or diluting or substituting a sample, all of which may merit
harsher penalties than a simple positive test result. Id. at 5.
65 See NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 6. A player has a right to waive this "B"
sample test. Id.
66 See id. at 5-6.
67 See id. at 5, 7 (explaining that, even if a player is unaware that an illegal
substance is in his system, a positive test result will still be punished). Even if a product
is approved by a team's trainer or medical staff, a positive result is still punishable. Id. at
6. Players with questions must contact the NFL Advisor in order to ensure compliance.
See id. at 5.
68 See id. at 7-9.
69 Id. All suspensions are subject to appeal by the player; such appeals can change
the start date of any suspension. Id. at 10. When there are fewer games remaining in a
season than the suspension mandates, including postseason games the player's team has
qualified for, the suspension will continue into the next season until the entire suspension
period has been served. Id. at 7.
70 NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 8.
7 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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for all substances and pass a physical conducted by the team physician before
returning to the team.75
B. MLB Steroid Testing Policy
In early 2005, MLB's Commissioner and the Major League Baseball
Players Association agreed on a drug-testing policy. This policy, entitled
"Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program"
(the "Program"), stated a three-fold purpose: 1) "to educate Players ... on
the risks associated with using" steroids; 2) "to deter and end the use by
Players of' steroids; and 3) "to provide for.., an orderly, systematic, and
cooperative resolution of any disputes that may arise concerning ... the
agreement. ' 76 It stated that no Major League player shall use any "anabolic
androgenic steroid[] covered by Schedule III of the Code of Federal
Regulations' Schedule of Controlled Substances" or any steroids that are
illegal to obtain. 77
In November of 2005, the "Program" was substantially revamped.78
With the signing of a new collective bargaining agreement in 2006, this
revamped "Program" was extended through the 2011 season.79 Below, the
specifics of the original "Program" and the changes that can be found in the
revamped "Program" are outlined.
1. Administration of Testing
a. The Original "Program"
The original "Program" was overseen by the Health Policy Advisory
Committee (HPAC), composed of two licensed physicians who are experts in
75 See id. at 6, 8.
7 6 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S JOINT DRUG PREvENTIoN AND TREATMENT
PROGRAM 1 (2005) (hereinafter MLB PROGRAM), available at http://mlb.mlb.comn/
mlb/downloads/joint drugprevention and treatment_program_2005.pdf. In November
2005, amphetamines were added to the list of banned substances. Press Release, MLB
Players Association, MiLB, MLBPA Announce New Drug Agreement (Nov. 15, 2005),
available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/pa/releases/releases.jsp?content=-
111505#summary. For a complete list of all prohibited substances, see MLB PROGRAM,
supra, at 3-4.
77 MLB PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 3.
78 See Michael Silverman, Baseball; MLB Beefs up its Steroid Policy, BOSTON
HERALD, Nov. 16, 2005, at 88 (highlighting aspects of the new MLB Program).
79 See Hal Bodley, Deal Brings Labor Peace Through '11, USA TODAY, Oct. 25,
2006, at 6C.
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drug and steroid use and abuse and two licensed attorneys.80 One of each is
chosen by the MLB Players Association, and the others are chosen by the
Commissioner. 81 HPAC would attempt to make all decisions unanimously,
but a majority vote would carry. 82 If a majority vote could not be reached,
the physician members would jointly choose another expert, a licensed
physician, to be the fifth member of the committee and cast the decisive
vote.83 HPAC, among other things, was charged with overseeing the testing
of players for steroid use following the procedures laid out in the
"Program."84 All testing was urine analysis8 5 conducted under direct
observation. 86
b. Changes in the Revamped "Program"
Under the revamped "Program" much of HPAC's responsibilities have
been substantially reduced. 87 An Independent Program Administrator, who
has no ties to either MLB or the MLB Players Association, will now oversee:
"1. The scheduling of tests"; "2. Supervision of the collection process"; and
"[3.] Reporting of positives." 88
2. Circumstances that Permit Testing
a. The Original "Program"
The "Program" allowed for three different types of testing: "in-season"
testing, "additional in-season and off-season" testing, 89 and "reasonable
cause" testing.90 "In-season" testing dictated that each player would be
randomly selected for testing once during the season, which began when
players reported to spring training and ended with the last regular season
80 MLB PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 1.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. The fifth member would be appointed within forty-eight hours of a failed
majority decision. Id
84 Id. at 2.
85 MLB PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 5.
86 Id. at 18. For a complete review of the urine collection and testing procedure, see
id. at 18-28.
87 See Press Release, supra note 76.
88 Id.
89 MLB PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 5.
90 Id. at6.
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game. 91 "Additional in-season and off-season" testing allowed the Office of
the Commissioner to do additional random testing of players with the number
and times of these tests to be determined by HPAC.92 Players could be
randomly selected for this type of testing an unlimited number of times.93
"Reasonable cause" testing happened when any HPAC member had
information that caused a reasonable belief that a player had used or
otherwise been involved with steroids in the last twelve months.94 At such
times, HPAC would have a meeting, and, if a majority of members agreed,
the player would be tested for steroid use within forty-eight hours.95
b. Changes in the Revamped "Program "
The revamped "Program" increases the frequency of testing of each
player, with each player being tested a minimum of twice a year.96 The first
test occurs during spring training physicals.97 The second test happens on a
randomly selected date in the regular season and is unannounced.98 In
addition to these tests, there will also be year-round random testing of
players.99 There is no limit to how many times a player may be subjected to
this random testing. 100 It is now the responsibility of the Independent
Administrator to schedule testing.10'
91 Id. at 5.
92 
_Id.
93 See id. ("Each Player shall remain subject to such additional tests regardless of the
number of tests taken by the Player during any calendar year.").
94 Id. at 6.
95 MLB PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 6.
96 See Press Release, supra note 76.
97 Id. ("Every player will have: 1. A pre-season test in connection with spring
training physicals.").
98 Id. ("Every player will have: .... 2. An unannounced test during the season on a
randomly selected date.").
99 Id. ("There will be additional, year-round random testing.").
100 Id. ("No matter how many times a player is tested, he remains subject to an
additional random test.").
101 Id.
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3. Procedures and Penalties for a Positive Test Result
a. The Original "Program"
Whether a player had a positive test result10 2 was determined by
HPAC. 10 3 HPAC would notify a player immediately if such a result was
found. 104 After notification, a player who had been found to have steroids
present in his urine could challenge the finding within two business days, but
he had to give a reason for the challenge.' 0 5 If no appeal was sought, the
Office of the Commissioner would, within twenty-four hours, inform the
player and his team of the disciplinary action imposed.' 0 6 The following
penalties were imposed for positive steroid results:
1. First positive test result: a 10-day suspension or up to a $10,000 fine;
2. Second positive test result: a 30-day suspension or up to a $25,000 fine;
3. Third positive test result: a 60-day suspension or up to a $50,000 fine;
4. Fourth positive test result: a one-year suspension or up to a $100,000
fine;
5. Any subsequent positive test result by a Player shall result in the
Commissioner imposing further discipline on the Player. The level of
discipline will be determined consistent with the concept of progressive
discipline.
All suspensions shall be without pay. 107
b. Changes in the Revamped "Program"
Under the revamped "Program," the Independent Administrator is now
responsible for reporting positive test results.' 08 The penalties that can be
applied are as follows: "1. First positive: 50 games"; "2. Second positive:
100 games"; "3. Third positive: Lifetime ban, subject to right to seek
102 Positive test results included the finding of steroids in a urine sample; refusal to
take a test; unexcused absence from a required test; an attempt to mask, dilute, or
substitute a sample; or any attempt to alter a test result. MLB PROGRAM, supra note 76,
at 6.
103 Id.
104 Id. at7.
105 Id. at 12.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 11-12.
108 See Press Release, supra note 76.
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reinstatement after two years of suspension, with arbitral review of
reinstatement decision."' 10 9
Part III discusses how collective bargaining hinders the implementation
of tough steroid-testing policies because of the lack of incentives on either
side of the table to push for tough policies, concluding that Congress should
intervene.
III. THE HURDLES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE NEED FOR
CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
Both MLB and the NFL are unionized organizations.I10 This means that
collective bargaining is used to dictate many aspects of how the organization
is run, including steroid-testing policies. 111 Because "juiced" players
generate higher revenues for owners by bringing in more fans, there is no
incentive for owners and professional organizations as a whole to push for
policies that would lead to a steroid-free environment in sports. 112 There are
some who still argue that collective bargaining agreements are the best way
to deal with the steroid problems in professional sports because collective
bargaining equalizes the bargaining power of players and owners, allowing
players to protect their rights. 113 One such right that players would want to
protect is the right not to use steroids."l 4 Congressional intervention is seen
as nothing more than a moral "witch hunt" to make steroid-using players out
to be "bad human beings," not an attempt to help players. 115 This ignores the
fact that many players may not want to be protected from using steroids for
various reasons, including: 1) a desire to reap the benefits of steroid use; 2) a
desire for increased physical abilities; 3) a desire to avoid the financial
burdens of positive steroid use; and 4) a desire to keep steroid use out of the
eyes of the public. Each of these issues is discussed below.
109 Id. Though these punishments are substantially harsher than the punishments in
the original "Program," many are still claiming that they are not harsh enough to deal
with the steroid controversy. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
"0 See Masteralexis, supra note 40, at 776 n. 1.
11 See id. (explaining that the National Labor Relations Board has held that drug
testing of employees must be subject to bargaining).
112 See Eric Gold, Around the Majors, SPORTS NETWORK, Mar. 16, 2005,
http://www.sportsnetwork.com/default.asp?c=sportsnetwork&page=mlb/misc/gold-archi
ve/mlbweekly_031605.htm (noting that MLB team owners turned a blind eye to steroid
use because the play of "juiced" players increased revenues).
113 See Masteralexis, supra note 40, at 776-78.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 777.
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A. Benefits of Steroid Use
In an environment where money is tied to outstanding performance, there
is little incentive to discourage players from using steroids and much to
ignore steroid use.1 16 "Juiced" players typically perform better, generating
more revenue for owners, which in turn generates higher salaries for
players.1 17 Fan admiration and media attention for their improved
performance are also benefits received from steroid use.118 In this
environment, it is not surprising that the current steroid-testing policies are
inadequate to solve the "juicing" problem; both sides of the bargaining table
stand to win by the continued use of steroids.
B. Increased Physical Ability
A desire for increased physical abilities can be two-fold: players may
need steroids in order to be at the needed physical level to play in the pros, or
players may seek to increase their abilities in order to reach the upper
echelons of the profession. 119 Though there are players that do wish to stamp
out the use of steroids in professional sports,120 as Department Head and
Associate Professor in the Department of Sport Management at the
University of Massachusetts-Amherst Lisa Pike Masteralexis points out,
players will do anything to reach their goal of being professional athletes.1 21
Thus, a player who knows that he physically cannot make the leap into the
Majors without steroid help would not want a strong steroid policy. Even if a
player can make it into the pros without steroids, steroids often allow players
116 See id. at 776-77; see also Shaun Assael & Peter Keating, Who Knew?, ESPN
THE MAG., Nov. 21, 2005, at 69, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/
story?page=steroids (detailing the way baseball management, trainers, and owners turned
a "blind eye" to steroid use). Some players have reported that trainers, scouts, and other
management personnel more than ignored steroid use; they in fact promoted it, though
indirectly. See Masteralexis, supra note 40, at 777 (noting that telling players they are
"too slow" or "too small" may have encouraged steroid use). Jose Conseco, in his book,
Juiced, claims that owners sent word to players, managers, and trainers to keep players
doing whatever they were doing to be "superhuman" in order to generate excitement and
homeruns. New in Paperback, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2006, at TI 1. For a complete history
of steroid use in MLB from the 1970s to present, see Assael & Keating, supra note 116.
117 See Masteralexis, supra note 40, at 777 (noting that "substantial financial
benefits," as well as other rewards garnered from fans, media, and management can be
obtained by "juicing"); see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See Sports, supra note 42, at 6, 7 (explaining that the current NFL policy on drug
testing was promoted by players who wanted to end steroid use for various reasons).
121 See Masteralexis, supra note 40, at 778.
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to reach the pinnacle of their chosen profession. 122 These pressures can cause
players to rely on the aid of steroids. If many players feel this pressure, there
is no desire on that side of the table to argue for strong steroid policies.
C. Avoidance of Financial Penalties
The desire of players to avoid financial penalties because of steroid use is
another disincentive to bargain for tougher steroid policies. Positive drug-test
results, as explained in Part I, often have consequences such as fines and
suspensions without pay. 123 Players have the extra financial incentive of
avoiding lost wages if they do currently take, or in the future decide to take,
steroids. 124 Even players who are not purposely taking steroids can still be
issued these fines and suspensions.' 25 There are substances that can cause a
player to test positive even though the player did not mean to break a steroid
policy.' 26 This extends the financial incentive against strong testing policies
to any player who may have a fear of an unintentional positive, which could
be a substantial number of players.
D. Keeping Drug Use from the Public
Keeping face in the public eye is also a factor motivating players against
strong steroid-testing policies. As has been seen with the Mark McGwire and
Barry Bonds stories, being convicted in the court of public opinion can
severely damage the integrity of a player's career, even keeping players out
122 See id. Current examples of these types of players can be seen throughout sports
today. Mark McGwire is known as a home-run king, whose 583 career home runs have
been drawn into question amid allegations of steroid use. See Hunt, supra note 13. Barry
Bonds, another home-run giant who, on August 7, 2007, broke Hank Aaron's all-time
home-run record, has been suspected of steroid use since the beginning of the steroids
controversy,. See Crumpacker & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 9.
123 See NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 6; MLB PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 11-12;
Press Release, supra note 76.
124 See Selig & Manfred, Jr., supra note 43, at 35.
125 See NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 4, 7 (explaining that players are responsible
for what is in their bodies and their lack of knowledge that they are taking a forbidden
substance is immaterial); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
126 See Biomedical Engineering: New Biological Engineering Study Results from
German Sport University, Institute of Biochemistry Described, OBESITY, FITNESS &
WELLNESS WEEK, Mar. 17, 2007, at 536 (stating that several over-the-counter nutritional
supplements contain steroids but do not label these steroids as ingredients); Kevin Acee,
Merriman Speaks with Goodell, Upshaw, SAN DIEGO UNION-TR[., Feb. 10, 2007, at D-4
(stating that San Diego linebacker Shawn Merriman contends that his positive drug test
was the result of the use of nutritional supplements that did not mark steroids as an
ingredient); see also NFL POLICY, supra note 44, at 4, 7.
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of the Hall of Fame.127 The quickness with which the public can turn against
a player is evident in the current Roger Clemens situation--Clemens has
gone from beloved, seven-time Cy-Young Award winner to "baseball's
scarlet letter" in a matter of months. 128 With mere allegations keeping
McGwire from the Hall of Fame and turning the public sentiment against
Bonds129 and Clemens, 130 an actual positive steroid test would be even more
devastating to a player in the public's eye, something that can severely harm
a player. 131 For example, players with confirmed steroid use, such as MLB
greats Jose Conseco and Ken Caminiti, may never be inducted into the Hall
of Fame; 132 the public will never view them in the same light as it did before
the rumors about steroid use were confirmed 133
Confidentiality is typically put into testing policies to avoid this issue,
but a recent case involving MLB has shown that even a confidentiality
agreement does not guarantee that the public will not learn of a positive test
result. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in late December, 2006, that
federal investigators had a right to the names of one hundred MLB players
who tested positive for steroid use in 2003.134 This decision overrode the
confidentiality agreement that was part of the testing policy. 135 Though the
order only gives the names over to the Justice Department, there is great
127 See Jody Vance, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 24 HOURS, Jan. 11, 2007, at 30
(noting that Mark McGwire was not inducted into the Hall of Fame in 2006 because of
his alleged steroid use, and that a similar fate may await Barry Bonds); Harry Stein,
Writers Scrutinize Big Mac and Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, at 2 (explaining
that McGwire was "emphatically rejected" for admission into the Hall of Fame because
of alleged steroid use).
128 See Red, supra note 29.
129 See Ann Killion, Once Loyal Bonds Fans Starting to Turn, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Jan. 11, 2007 (noting that San Francisco Giants fans are "fed up" with "Bonds and
his sordid, overwrought story" and his "chase for the sour, tainted record").
130 See, e.g., Red, supra note 29.
131 See Vance, supra note 127 ("Public opinion is extremely powerful .... It can
destroy reputations, cancel endorsements and ... lessen the value of your
autobiography.").
132 Bob Hertzel, Hall Voters Have Set New Guidelines, DOMINION POST, Jan. 10,
2007.
133 See Jorge L. Ortiz, Ruling Could Expose 100-Plus Tests; Future Programs Might
See Effect, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2006, at 6C (quoting Bob Lanza, partner with
Sonnensschein Nath and Rosenthal "a positive drug test.., can stain an athlete's
reputation for years and negatively impact his.., endorsement opportunities").
134 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
2006), withdrawn and superseded by United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.
513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008).
135 Id.
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speculation that the results will become public. 136 This ruling will likely have
a chilling effect on collective bargaining for testing policies, 137 making
minimal or non-existent testing more attractive to players wanting to avoid
losing face in the public eye.
E. Why Should Congress Get in the Game?
With all these factors, the inability to fight the steroid problem is not
surprising. The policies of both MLB 138 and the NFL 139 have come under
scrutiny. MLB substantially increased its testing policies in November of
2005 under the threat of congressional intervention, but even this "juiced" up
policy has critics calling for more. 140 The Mitchell Report recommended 19
changes to improve MLB's testing program, but to implement some of these
recommendations, the Players Association must cooperate with MLB.141 The
Player's Association has refused to consent to such changes, claiming that
the current testing policy is "working fine. ' 142 It is important to emphasize
that the November 2005 upgrading of the "Program" came into being
136 See Peter Schmuck, Confidence is Low that Steroid Test Results Will Stay
Confidential,- Commentary, BALT. SUN, Dec. 29, 2006, at 2E.
137 See Ortiz, supra note 133 ("The inability of player unions to keep drug-test
results confidential will only complicate collective bargaining with leagues.").
138 See Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 48, at 141 (noting that MLB has been
condemned for its weak policy on steroids); see also Keith Dobkowski, New Steroid
Policy in Effect, LEGALBALL.COM, http://legalball.com/MLBNews 2005_Steroids_
Policy (last visited Jan. 24, 2008) ("[M]any are calling the new [MLB steroid] policy
soft.").
139 See Taylor, supra note 14 (detailing the NFL's inability to detect some forms of
steroid use).
140 See Sally Jenkins, Baseball Takes Its Best Swing, but the Game Continues,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at El (noting that the new policy will do nothing more than
punish players "dumb enough to get caught," not end the steroid problem); Stephen A.
Smith, Loopholes Undercut Steroids Agreement, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 18,
2005, at D2 (calling for even harsher penalties for first- and second-time positive results,
much more in line with what Congress proposed in legislation); Editorial, MLB Steroids
Policy Misses the Plate, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 17, 2005, at 12C (stating that the
new baseball penalties, though an improvement, did not send the correct message because
they were not harsh enough).
141 See Ken Davidoff, The Mitchell Report; All-Star Shame, NEWSDAY, Dec. 14,
2007, at A02. MLB Commissioner Bud Selig has instituted all the improvements
recommended by the Mitchell Report that MLB could institute unilaterally. Id.
142 Union Lawyer Says Drug Program Fine, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Feb. 26, 2008, at D2.
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because of pressure put on the MLB Players Association from Congress143
and, specifically, Senator John McCain. 144 Bud Selig, Commissioner of
Baseball, tried to pass the same steroid program in 2002, but the Players
Association would not sign off and continued to rebuff his attempts until
Congress threatened action,145 just as the Players Association is doing now
with the Mitchell recommendations. This shows that, if left to collective
bargaining alone, steroid testing policies will not meet a standard needed to
stop usage.
Even the NFL program, pegged as the "model" program, 146 has major
flaws. These flaws are most clearly seen in the complete failure to catch even
one of several players "juicing" on the 2003 Carolina Panthers Team. 147
Again, when left to the devices of collective bargaining alone, steroid testing
programs, even the oldest and most comprehensive programs, are not
sufficient to fight the steroid problem. 148 The only way to fight the problem
is to have a party intervene whose sole objective is to end steroid abuse.
Congress would qualify as such a party.
Part IV will discuss whether Congress can constitutionally mandate a
steroid testing policy.
143 See Evan Grant, MLB Steroid Rules: 3 Strikes, You're Out: U.S. Pressure Spurs
Longer Suspensions; Amphetamines Targeted, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005,
at lA (noting that pressure from Congress led to tougher penalties for steroid use).
144 See Phil Rogers, Baseball to Steroid Users: 1, 2, 3 Strikes, You're Out, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 16, 2005, at 1 (noting that, until McCain "turned up the heat" on MLB Player
Association leader Donald Fehr, the Association refused to sign off on the testing policy).
145 See id.; Michael O'Keeffe & T.J. Quinn, It's 3 Strikes and Yer Out! Strict
Doping Rules Now Include Speed, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, at 60 ("Union
officials fought [Selig] from the [beginning of his attempt to pass tougher testing
policies], arguing that players had the same privacy rights as any other citizens, but began
to acquiesce when it was clear that... Congress [was] behind the commissioner.").
146 See Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 46, at 141 ("[T]he NFL triumphs in all
categories for its denunciation, condemnation and punishment of its professional athletes'
use of steroids. The NFL and the NFLPA have crafted a policy that has both the league's
and the players' best interests in mind."); see also Selig & Manfred, Jr., supra note 43, at
54 (noting that the NFL has the most comprehensive testing program).
147 See Taylor, supra note 14; Weiner, supra note 16.
148 See Taylor, supra note 14 (stating that former NFL lineman Dana Stubblefield
believes that thirty percent of NFL players are using human growth hormone, while Jon
Jansen, an offensive lineman for the Washington Redskins, believes fifteen to twenty
percent of players use some form of performance-enhancing drug).
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IV. CAN CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY DRAIN THE "JUICE" OUT OF
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS?
Even though congressional intervention is appropriate and necessary in
the case of steroid use in sports, the type of intervention that can and should
take place is much less clear. In 2005, at the height of the original steroid
controversy, Congress threatened to mandate drug-testing protocols 149 for all
four of the major professional sports organizations in America: the NFL, the
NBA, the NHL, and MLB. But this approach may have serious constitutional
implications. By forcing sports organizations to test their athletes under
specific protocols, a congressional steroid-testing policy would compel an
action by a private group. 150 This would render the policy subject to the
Constitution' 5' and, most importantly, the Fourth Amendment. 152 In this
Part, this Note explores whether or not the Supreme Court would likely find
that a congressionally-mandated steroid-testing policy could withstand a
Fourth Amendment challenge by exploring the Court's approach to both drug
testing in public high schools and drug testing of government employees.
A. What Does it Take to Pass Constitutional Muster Under the
Fourth Amendment?
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches
and seizures. 153 Following current Supreme Court precedent, it seems clear
149 See Mitten, supra note 39, at 804 (noting that Congress proposed legislating in
2005 to unify drug-testing policies for professional sports organizations).
150 See Lewis Kurlantzick, Symposium: From Grand Slams to Grand Juries:
Performance-Enhancing Drug Use in Sports: Symposium Contribution: Is There a
Steroids Problem? The Problematic Character of the Case for Regulation, 40 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 789, 792 n. 11 (2006) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 614-16 (1989)).
151 See id.
152 See id. This policy would also raise issues with the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause because professional athletes, as a group, would be treated
differently than other private employees not subject to drug testing. See Mitten, supra
note 39, at 805. This would be a very difficult claim to win due to the nature of
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Professional athletes are not a protected group, thus the
testing policy would only have to meet a rational basis test. See id. This would likely be
satisfied fairly easily, especially with Congress's findings of the impact that steroids have
on the youth of America. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text. See also Clean
Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. §2(a)(4). Because of the weak nature of this
claim, this Note does not focus on Fourteenth Amendment issues.
153 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002).
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that the collection of urine samples for testing would constitute a search,154
and accordingly Congress would have to show the reasonableness of its
action in order for drug-testing policies to pass constitutional muster.
Reasonableness usually implies probable cause,155 but the Court has made
some exceptions when the reason for the search is not criminal in nature.156
One set of exceptions flowing from a lack of criminal objectives has come .tO
be known as "special needs"'157 searches and seizures. 158 This applies when
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the.., probable-cause requirement impracticable."' 159  Assuming that
Congress would not use test results for criminal purposes, 160 fitting a
mandatory policy into this area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would
be the best way to develop a constitutional policy. In order to determine
whether or not the Court is likely to find a special need with steroid use, the
history and development of the "special needs" doctrine must be evaluated,
in its early context and in the context of drug and alcohol testing, and then
applied to the steroid situation.
1. The Early Development of the "Special Needs " Doctrine
The "special needs" doctrine began with the case of New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,161 a case involving a student who, after denying that she had been
smoking in violation of school rules, was forced to open her purse by the
assistant vice principal to see if there were cigarettes present. 162 While
looking at the pack of cigarettes, the assistant vice principal also noticed
154 See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1989) (stating that the
collection of urine constituted a search by public school officials).
155 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
156 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.01, at 323-
25 (3d ed. 2002) (noting the Court's attempt to draw a line between the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment for criminal and non-criminal matters).
157 This is also known as the "special governmental needs" doctrine. Id. at 338.
158 See id. at 338-39.
159 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
160 If Congress did want to use test results for criminal purposes, then random drug
testing would be out of the question. The Court has been very firm in stating that, if the
primary purpose of a suspicionless search is to "detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing," then such searches are not constitutional. See City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000); see also DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 336-38
(outlining the jurisprudence regarding government drug-interdiction checkpoints).
161 469 U.S. 325 (1985). See also DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 339.
162 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-29.
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cigarette rolling papers commonly associated with marijuana. 163 The
assistant vice principal then completely searched the purse and found
marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. 164 The Supreme Court held the
search constitutional, 165 even while holding that students had a right to
privacy.166
In finding the search constitutional, the Court held that school officials
did not have to have a warrant to search students so long as the search is
reasonable. 167 The reasonableness of a search does not have to reach the
level of probable cause when the Court determines, as it did in this case, that
the balancing of the governmental interest and the private interest "suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause." 168 To determine the
reasonableness of a search, the Court held that a two-part test applied: 1) the
action must be reasonably related to the end objective of the search, and 2)
the search must "not [be] excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction."'169
O'Connor v. Ortega 70 presented the next development in the
doctrine. 171 This case involved the search of a state doctor's office without a
warrant. 172 A plurality of the Court held that, though merely being a
government employee did not destroy one's privacy interest, some
employees may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from certain
other individuals, such as supervisors. 173 The plurality held that a warrantless
search could be conducted of such employees' offices and the like, 174 but
that the reasonableness test set down in T.L.O. had to be followed. 175 The
plurality reinforced the idea that special exceptions could be made when a
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 341-43.
166 Id. at 339 ("[S]choolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety
of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have
necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto
school grounds.").
167 Id. at 341.
168 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
169 Id. at 342.
170 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
171 See DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 341.
172 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713.
173 Id. at 717-18 (plurality).
174 Id. at 722 (plurality) (holding that the requirement of a warrant would be
unworkable in the government office environment).
17 5 Id. at 726.
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warrant requirement is "not suitable... because such a requirement would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed" in a given situation, 176 and that the need to show
probable cause did not lie when the reason for the search was not criminal in
nature. 17
7
2. Special Needs and Drug and Alcohol Testing
The Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of random drug and alcohol
testing in a series of decisions dating back to 1989.178 In most cases, the
Court has allowed random testing, but it has placed limits on such testing. 179
There have also been circumstances where testing was completely barred by
the Court. 180 Most notably, testing is not constitutional when it is used for a
symbolic purpose. 181 This section will outline the case history of both
allowed and banned testing, then summarize the factors the Court looks to
when deciding if a program is constitutional.
a. Circumstances Where the Supreme Court has Allowed Drug and
Alcohol Testing
The Court began tackling the realm of drug testing in public employment
with the tandem cases of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association182 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.183
Skinner involved drug and alcohol testing by blood and urine analysis of
covered employees in the railroad industry after a series of major accidents
had occurred. 184 In response to a well-documented drug and alcohol abuse
and detection problem in the railroad industry, the Federal Railroad
Association ("FRA"), a government entity, promulgated a drug and alcohol
testing program.185 Testing was implemented, pursuant to the regulations, by
176 Id. at 720-22.
177 Id. at 724.
178 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
179 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (stating that the Court will not readily allow
testing in circumstances outside of a public school setting).
180 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (striking down a policy that
required testing of Georgia's political candidates).
18 1 Id. at 322.
182 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
183 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
184 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609-10.
185 Id. at 606-08. It is important to note that the FRA compiled and presented
extensive evidence regarding the drug and alcohol problems in the railroad industry. The
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private railway companies. 186 The Court held that, even though the testing
was done by a private entity, it was done under "compulsion of sovereign
authority," and thus must adhere to the demands of the Fourth
Amendment. 187 The Court stressed that concerns about personal autonomy
were important, due to the invasive nature of blood collection and the
observation of urine collection, and ultimately held that both activities
qualified as "searches" under the Fourth Amendment, 188 and thus had to be
reasonable. ' 89
In order to evaluate the reasonableness of the search, the Court
determined that a special need faced the FRA and private railroads, 190 and,
after dispensing with the question of whether or not a warrant was needed,' 91
addressed the issue of probable cause through a balancing of the interests
involved. 192
The Court stated three reasons why a warrant was unnecessary in this
context: 1) there was no need for a neutral magistrate to evaluate the facts
because there was a standardized protocol in place dictating who would be
problem was so obvious to the Court that the Skinner opinion begins by opining that
"[t]he problem of alcohol use on American railroads is as old as the industry itself," and
listing statistics that showcase this problem. Id. at 606. This is something that Justice
Scalia, who signed onto the majority in Skinner, takes great pains to point out in his
dissent in Von Raab, discussed infra, where the majority upheld a testing scheme for the
U.S. Customs Services without this showing of a drug abuse problem. See Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 681.
186 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
187 Id. at 614.
188 Id. at 616-18. The Court had previously held blood collection to be a search, see
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966), but the issue of urine had never
before been broached. The holding in Skinner that urine collection was a "search"
centered intently on the private nature of urination and the intrusion that forcing someone
to have his or her urination observed caused:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing
of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance
in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816
F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)).
189 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
190Id. at 620 ("The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad
employees to ensure safety... 'likewise presents "special needs" beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements."') (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (allowing
for warrantless searches of probationers)).
191 Id. at 621-24.
192 Id. at 624.
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tested, which minimized discretion;193 2) a warrant requirement would hinder
the testing because drugs and alcohol leave the body quickly, and the delay
of waiting on the warrant could "result in the destruction of valuable
evidence;"'194 and 3) railroad personnel implementing the tests had limited
familiarities with the warrant requirements, and it would be unreasonable to
force them to learn the particulars.195
The Court next dealt with the issue of probable cause, stating that,
though the Fourth Amendment typically required some individualized
suspicion for a search to be reasonable, "[i]n limited circumstances, where
the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed
in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion."' 196 The Court found this to
be such a case. 197
When determining the privacy interest of employees, the Court noted
that the taking of blood is "not significant" because such tests are now
"commonplace."' 198 Though the Court reiterated its issues with urine
collection, it held that the current program, which allowed collection in a
medical environment and without observation of the actual act of urination,
minimized the privacy issues at hand. 199 Importantly, the Court emphasized
that railroad workers have a reduced privacy interest because they work in a
heavily regulated industry, which helped to minimize the intrusiveness of the
testing that might not be so minimal in other settings. 200
The Court balanced this minimal privacy interest with the interest of the
government to regulate drug use, categorizing that interest as compelling.201
Most notably, the Court, relying on the FRA evidence, emphasized that the
employees being tested could cause "great human loss before any signs of
impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others. '20 2 Also, the Court
193 Id. at 622.
194 Id. at 623.
195 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24. For a concise summary of Skinner's holding on
warrants, see DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 344-45.
196 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 625.
199 Id. at 626.
200 Id. at 628 ("Though some of the privacy interests implicated by the.., testing at
issue reasonably might be viewed as significant in other contexts .... a diminished
expectation of privacy attaches to information relating to the physical condition of
covered employees and to this reasonable means of procuring such information.").
201 Id.
202 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
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noted that there was a deterrent effect of the testing because an employee
could not know when he would ever be involved in an accident that would
trigger testing, thus employees would generally avoid drug and alcohol
use.203 In the end, the Court held that the compelling interest of the
government far outweighed the minimal privacy interest of the employees
and upheld the program.20 4
Tracking its logic from Skinner, the Court in Von Raab upheld the drug
testing of U.S. Customs Service employees seeking certain promotions.205
Again, the Court held there was a special need that did not require a warrant
or probable cause206 and, after balancing privacy interests and government
interests, held in favor of the government. 20 7 The two cases are not
completely analogous, however, as Justices Scalia and Stevens, who both
voted to uphold testing in Skinner, dissented in Von Raab.20 8 The dissent,
authored by Scalia, notes that the majority's opinion will be "searched in
vain for real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by urine testing of
Customs Service employees," and that this lack of evidence of use or a
connection to a real harm was the reason he could not join the majority.20 9
The majority focused on the possible harms of drug use because of the
exposure that Customs employees have to controlled substances and drug
smugglers, stating that employees are often the target of bribery210 and that
the "Government has a compelling interest in ensuring that the front-line
interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity
and judgment," 211 something drug testing could help ensure. But, as Scalia
points out:
What is... notably absent, revealingly absent, and as far as I am
concerned dispositively absent-is the recitation of even a single instance in
which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is,
203 Id. at 629-30 ("By ensuring that employees ... know they will be tested upon
the occurrence of a triggering event, the timing of which no employee can predict with
certainty, the regulations significantly increase the deterrent effect of the administrative
penalties associated with the prohibited conduct.").
204 Id. at 633.
205 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
206 Id. at 665-66.
207 Id. at 679.
208 See DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 345.
209 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 668-69.
211 Id. at 670.
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in which the cause of bribe-taking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law
enforcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug use.212
Scalia, joined by Stevens, stressed that the only plausible reason to have
the drug-testing policy was to prove a point and make government employees
an example of the Government's commitment to the war on drugs, something
that is constitutionally unacceptable. 213
As Professor Joshua Dressier points out, these two cases read together
seem to suggest that a warrantless, suspicionless drug-testing policy aimed at
public employees is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when: 1) "the
employee is working in a job already pervasively regulated"; 2) "there is a
close relationship between the employee's job responsibilities and the
employer's concern about drug or alcohol use"; 3) "the regulations
authorizing the testing remove most or all of the employer's discretion in
determining which employees will be tested and under what circumstances it
will occur"; 4) "there is evidence presented that a system based on an
individualized system is impracticable or would frustrate the non-law-
enforcement purpose of the testing"; and 5) "care is taken to protect the
dignitary interest of employees in the specimen collection process." 214
The Court expanded the realm of warrantless, suspicionless drug testing
outside of public employees with the holding 215 in Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton.2 16 The case involved the urine testing of high school students
involved in athletics, both before the season began and randomly during the
season. 217 Though students were observed providing the urine sample, males
were allowed to remain clothed with their back to an observer twelve to
fifteen feet behind them, while females provided the sample while in an
enclosed stall. 2 18 Observers were of the same sex.2 19
When addressing the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court found that a
special governmental need applied, and that neither a warrant nor individual
212 Id. at 683. Even the Commissioner of Customs admitted that he felt that the
department was largely drug-free and that drug use was not the reason the program was
put into place. Id.
213 Id. at 686-87 ("I think it obvious that this justification is unacceptable; that the
impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that
symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs,
cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search.").
214 DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 346.
2 15 Id. at 348.
216 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
217 Id. at 650.
218 Id.
219Id.
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suspicion was needed for the search to be reasonable.220 The Court then
evaluated the privacy interest of the students, holding that because this case
dealt with "children, who.., have been committed to the temporary custody
of the State as schoolmaster," the students involved had a diminished
expectation of privacy compared to adults.221 The Court also held that, in
regards to medical examinations and procedures, the privacy interest for
students was even lower because students are often required to undergo
certain medical examinations "[f]or their own good and that of their
classmates." 222 The Court further held that student athletes, by voluntarily
"choosing to 'go out for the team,"' further diminish their claims to privacy
because athletes must undergo extra physical examination, as well as change
in front of other students with minimal privacy. 223 The Court analogized
athletes to adults in "closely regulated industries," stating that, "students who
voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions
upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." 224 The fact that the
conditions under which the samples were collected were "nearly identical to
those typically encountered in public restrooms, which ... schoolchildren
use daily," further helped to alleviate any concerns the Court had in regards
to privacy interests. 225
Next, the Court evaluated the government interest, further defining what
was meant in earlier cases by the need for a compelling government interest:
"the phrase describes an interest that appears important enough to justify the
particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy." 226 In the Court's
opinion, deterring student drug use was "at least as important as enhancing
efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs,"
the interest found compelling in Von Raab.227 Though the Respondents
argued that there were less restrictive ways to deal with the problem, the
Court noted that it has "repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least
intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth
220 Id. at 653.
221 Id. at 654-56 ("T.L.O . ... emphasized, that the nature of [the] power [of the
State over school children] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision
and control that could not be exercised over free adults.") (emphasis added).
222 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
223 Id. at 657.
224 Id.
225 Id at 658.
226 Id. at 661.
2 2 7 1d. The Court's emphasis on the desire to stop student drug use may weigh
heavily on any attempt by Congress to regulate professional athletes; the constitutionality
may hinge on whether or not a connection between professional use of steroids and child
and teenage use of steroids can be made. See infra Part IV.B.5.
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Amendment. '228 Relying on the district court findings of a drug problem that
disrupted the educational process and was centered around athletes,229 the
Court concluded "a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role model' effect of
athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively
addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs;" 230 thus, the testing
program was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 231 Though this
opinion seems to vastly increase the sweep of the special needs doctrine,232
the Court set a limit on how far it intended the opinion to reach:
We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will
readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts. The most significant
element in this case is the first we discussed: that the [drug testing p]olicy
was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
care.
233
As this statement emphasizes, the decision of the Court was centered on
the nature of the reduced privacy interests of those being tested; the reduction
of privacy was key to the Court's holding.234
Though the Court has imposed some limits, an expansion of the doctrine
has occurred. In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls,235 the Court upheld a testing policy that tested
228 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
229 The District Court made substantial findings about the drug problem in
Vernonia:
Drugs had not been a major problem in Vemonia schools. In the mid-to-late
1980's, however, teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use.
Students began to speak out about their attraction to the drug culture, and to boast
that there was nothing the school could do about it. Along with more drugs came
more disciplinary problems ... . . [D]isciplinary referrals ... [more than
doubled] .... [A]s the District Court found, athletes were the leaders of the drug
culture.
Id. at 648-49. This type of connection between athlete use and student use was a central
focus of the Court's evaluation.
230 Id. at 663.
231 Id. at 664-65.
232 See DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 348 ("Vernonia School District is an important
expansion of the "special needs" doctrine. It authorizes random suspicionless drug-testing
outside the public-employment sphere to which some commentators hoped the doctrine
would be limited.").
233 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (emphasis added).
234 For a synopsis of all the limiting factors of Vernonia, see DRESSLER, supra note
156, at 348-49.
235 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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all students participating in any extracurricular activity, whether or not it was
athletic in nature.236 The Court stated that, although in Vernonia it had
focused on athletes having an even more diminished privacy interest due to
the nature of medical exams and the changing of clothes prevalent in that
context, Vernonia was not dependent on that finding. 237 The Court
emphasized the "nationwide drug epidemic," 238 along with the finding that a
drug problem existed in the school district at issue.239 This, coupled with the
safety concerns that drug use poses to all students,2 40 led the Court to hold
that this more expansive drug-testing program was constitutional.241
b. Circumstances Where the Supreme Court Did Not Allow Drug
Testing
The limitations provided in Vernonia are not the only ones the Court has
placed on drug testing. In Chandler v. Miller, the Court struck down a drug-
testing policy that required candidates for state office in Georgia to pass a
drug test.242 The Court failed to find a special need in the testing program
because there was a lack of "any indication of a concrete danger demanding
departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule," 243 something present in
other special needs cases:
Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respondents broadly
describe[d], [having drug users as state officials] are real and not simply
hypothetical for Georgia's polity. The statue was not enacted, as counsel for
respondents readily acknowledged at oral argument, in response to any fear
or suspicion of drug use by state officials. 244
The Court also pointed out that the "demonstrated problem of drug
abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing
236 Id. at 838.
231 Id. at 831.
238 Id. at 834. The Court puts great emphasis on the national drug problem in this
country, going so far as to quote statistics for drug use in 12th graders throughout the
country. Id. at 834 n.5. The desire to reduce drug use could be a factor that could help
Congress argue for a compelling interest in testing sports professionals. See infra Part
IV.B.5.
239 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834-35.
240Id. at 836 (finding that "the safety interest furthered by drug testing is
undoubtedly substantial for all children, athletes and nonathletes alike").
241 Id. at 838.
242 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
243 Id. at 319.
244 Id.
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regime,. . . would shore up an assertion of special need for a suspicionless
general search program." 245 The Court found that Georgia was simply testing
candidates for "symbol's sake," and that the "Fourth Amendment shields
society against that state action,"246 reiterating Justice Scalia's point in his
Von Raab dissent.247
c. What it Takes to Pass Constitutional Muster Under the Fourth
Amendment
It would appear that the Court is most likely to allow warrantless,
suspicionless drug testing when: 1) the immediate objective of the test is not
for law enforcement purposes; 2) there is a reduced expectation of privacy
either because there is substantial regulation of the industry or because
students, who have diminished privacy rights, are being tested; 3) there is
evidence of an established drug problem that is affecting the public safety
either by causing harm to innocents or to users and those who may imitate
them; and 4) random testing is likely to help solve the drug problem through
deterrence. The next subpart will apply these factors to the circumstances
surrounding congressionally mandated drug testing in professional sports.
B. Can Congress Fit a Mandatory Steroid Testing Policy into the
Realm of the Special Needs Doctrine?
In order to determine whether the U.S. Supreme Court would find a
congressionally mandated drug testing program constitutional in the context
of professional sports, an examination of the four criteria identified above is
required: 1) non-criminal objective, 2) reduced expectation of privacy, 3)
245 Id.
246 Id. at 322. The Court summarized the issues with the testing:
Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected
officials, those officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks,
and the required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort. The need
revealed, in short, is symbolic, not "special," as that term draws meaning from our
case law.
Id. at 321-22.
247 The Court further limited the special needs doctrine in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). The case involved the testing of maternity patients
suspected of cocaine use. Id. at 71-72. The Court held that the program was
unconstitutional, centering on the fact that the immediate goal of the searches was to
"generate evidence for law enforcement purposes." Id. at 83. Because this Note assumes
that Congress will not use steroid testing for criminal prosecutions, this case is largely
inapplicable to the topic at hand. For a summary of all the issues raised in Ferguson, see
DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 350-53.
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substantial evidence of a drug problem and its harms, and 4) testing will help
solve the problem. Even if these criteria are met, a program must still pass
the special needs balancing between the privacy interests at stake and the
governmental interest asserted. This subpart explores the realm of the special
needs doctrine as it applies to professional athletes and Congress, stressing
what the parameters of any statute Congress would attempt to enact should
be and the types of evidence that Congress would need to compile in order to
pass constitutional muster. This subpart also outlines the arguments that
would surround the balancing test the Supreme Court would undertake. To
make these observations, this subpart focuses on the findings Congress made
in 2005, embodied in two bills presented to the House and Senate, the Clean
Sports Act of 2005248 and the Drug Free Sports Act.249 Ultimately, this
subpart concludes that Congress is likely unable to constitutionally mandate
testing due to a lack of diminished privacy interests for professional athletes.
1. Non-Criminal Objective
For the Court to uphold any suspicionless, warrantless, drug-testing
policy as constitutional, the immediate objective of such a program cannot be
to file criminal charges. 250 It is clear that Congress cannot put a drug-testing
policy in place that has criminal sanctions as a part of the testing system. 251
As such, the statute must have only fines, suspensions, and bans as
punishment for a positive result. The Clean Sports Act and the Drug Free
Sports Act both represent good models of a punishment system that would
not violate this prong. Both programs provided mandatory suspension for
violations, with no criminal punishment present in the scheme.252 Such a
system will allow the Court to easily dismiss the warrant requirement, a
requirement to fit in the special needs doctrine.
248 S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005).
249 H.R 3084, 109th Cong. (2005).
250 See DRESSLER, supra note 156, at § 19.
251 See id. at 336-38.
252 See Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 4(b)(7) (2005); Drug Free
Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. § 3(a)(5)(A) (2005). It is important to note, however,
that both bills required that the names of athletes who tested positive be made public. See
S. 1114, § 4(b)(9); H.R. 3084, § 3(a)(5)(B). The Clean Sports Act also required the name
of the substance that the athlete tested positive for to be disclosed. See S. 1114, § 4(b)(9).
This public disclosure could raise issues if law enforcement used the information to
launch criminal investigations, but how the Court would deal with such an abuse of the
system is unknown. To avoid any issues that may arise from such disclosure, Congress
should avoid public disclosure of test results.
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2. Reduced Expectation of Privacy
One key to all the situations in which the Court has upheld drug testing is
a finding of some sort of reduced privacy interest, either because an industry
is already highly regulated 253 or because the persons being tested have some
reduced privacy expectation because they are, for a temporary time, in the
custody and responsibility of the State. 254 This factor will be the hardest for
Congress to show. Neither the NFL nor MLB255 are highly regulated by
Congress currently, nor are professional athletes in any way in the custody of
the State. However, the Court has stated that athletes, by the very nature of
required medical exams and changing in front of others, are often like
employees in closely regulated industries and have "reason to expect
intrusions upon.., privacy." 256 Standing alone, this blanket statement may
appear to give Congress hope, but this was made in the context of public
school children who already have a diminished expectation of privacy
compared to adults.257 Thus, in analyzing the privacy rights of student
athletes, the Court was already in the framework of people with diminished
rights; adults in non-heavily regulated industries are different. The Court
underscored this point in Vernonia by stating that the most important finding
for constitutionality was that the program was instituted "in furtherance of
the government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian
and tutor of children entrusted to its care." 258 This point was further
emphasized by the Court in Earls, which stated that the medical exams and
changing in front of others were not dispositive in Vernonia259-what was
really important was that students, in general, have a diminished right of
privacy. Without the framework of a school, the Court will be hard-pressed
to find a diminished privacy interest.
It has been argued that language in Chandler v. Miller can be used to
find that there is a diminished right of privacy when an adult, by means of his
or her occupation, is subject to intense public scrutiny.260 In Chandler,
253 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
254 See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-56 (1995).
255 In fact, MLB has even less regulation than most industries because courts have
repeatedly held that MLB is exempt from all anti-trust laws. See Marc Chalpin,
Comment, It Ain't Over 'Til it's Over: The Century Long Conflict Between the Owners
and the Players in Major League Baseball, 60 ALB. L. REv. 205, 213 (1996).
256 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
257 See id. at 653.
258 Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
259 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002).
260 See Joshua Peck, Note, Last Resort: The Threat of Federal Steroid Legislation-
Is the Proposed Legislation Constitutional?, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1777, 1820-23 (2006).
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Justice Ginsberg states that "[c]andidates for public office . . . are subject to
relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the press. Their day-to-
day conduct attracts attention notably beyond the norm in ordinary work
environments." 261 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, latches on to this
language to insinuate that the majority found a diminished right of privacy
for public officials because of their place in the spotlight.262
Taken out of context, this language may appear to support such an
argument, but, within the confines of the opinion, the phrase is used to
distinguish Chandler from Von Raab and thus strike down testing.263 There
is no mention in the opinion about a diminished privacy right for candidates,
let alone a statement of why such a diminished right would exist. Also, such
a reading of Chandler does not align with the explicit statements made by the
Court in Vernonia as to who has diminished privacy interests. 264
Such a reading would also open the door for diminished privacy rights
for anyone in the public eye, such as celebrities and musicians. It is well
documented that persons in those professions are role models for the youth of
America265 and have publicized substance abuse problems. 266 In fact, the
drugs abused by these professionals (alcohol, prescription drugs, and
marijuana, to name a few) arguably affect more students than steroid
abuse. 267 As explained in Part IV.B.5, Congress's best argument for a
261 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
262 Id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
263 Id. at 321-22.
264 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
265 Part of the reason to stop steroid use in professional sports is to stop the use of
steroids in children and teenagers under a "role model" effect theory. See Clean Sports
Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2005). See also Bush, supra note 38 (noting
that professional athletes are role models for young people).
266 See, e.g., Bill Hutchinson, The Snorting Lifefor Brit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26,
2007, at 19 (reporting on Britney Spears' alleged cocaine and ecstasy abuse and
admission into rehab); Kathleen Deveny with Raina Kelley, Girls Gone Bad: Paris,
Britney, Lindsay & Nicole: They Seem to Be Everywhere and They May Not Be Wearing
Underwear, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 2007, at 40 (exploring the images that celebrities
portray to teens and how teens look to celebrities as role models).
267 See Strengthening Communities: An Overview of Service and Volunteering in
America Before the Subcomm. on Healthy Families and Communities of the H. Comm. on
Education and Labor 9 (Feb. 27, 2007) (testimony of David Eisner, Chief Executive
Officer, Corporation for National and Community Service, reporting that 15% of high
school students use "illicit drugs and the abuse of prescription drugs is on the rise"),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/110hcatl.html; Teens Turn Away From
Street Drugs, Move to Prescription Drugs, New Report Reveals, HEALTH Bus. WEEK,
Mar. 9, 2007, at 625 (reporting that marijuana and prescription drugs are the two leading
drugs abused by teenagers); Jo Anne Grunbaum et al., Youth Risk Behavior
Surveillance-United States, 2003, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, May 21,
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compelling governmental interest to regulate professional athletes is to argue
that, under a role model theory, professional use of steroids influences the
use of steroids in young people.268 Under a reading of the case law that
renders all people in the public eye subject to diminished privacy rights,
Congress could foreseeably mandate drug testing for musicians and
celebrities under a similar theory: celebrity and musician use affects child
use. This slippery slope cannot be what the Court mandated in Chandler by
rejecting a drug-testing policy for politicians. For these reasons, such an
argument does not have firm grounding in the case law.
Without meeting this prong, Congress will have a much harder time
tipping the balance between the privacy interest of the athletes and the
compelling interest it asserts. If the governmental interest is profound
enough, the Court may still uphold a statute even without a diminished
privacy interest. This approach is discussed in Part IV.B.5, infra.
2004, at 61 (finding that only 6.1% of high school students reported using illegal steroids
in 2003). See also Drugs & Alcohol, TEENSHEALTH, http://kidshealth.org/teen/
drugalcohol/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (providing information on drug and alcohol use
in teenagers and the dangers associated with such use). The U.S. Department of Justice
offers a self-reported study of twelfth-grade students that shows an even greater
difference between steroid use and other illegal drugs and alcohol:
Self-Reported Drug and Alcohol Use by High
School Seniors, 2004
100%
80% -
SoAny use in the previous
40% 12 months
20%20% - - -
0%
Alcohol Marijuana Steroids
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS:
DRUG USE IN THE GENERAL POPULATION (on file with author). For 2006 statistics, see
filettp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/du.htm (last visited May 4, 2008). No matter which
study is viewed, it is clear that abuse of steroids does not come close to matching abuse
of other drugs and alcohol by high school students.
268 Stopping child drug use has already been held to be a compelling governmental
interest, even under a role model theory of use. See Vemonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
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3. Substantial Evidence of a Drug Problem and Its Harms
No matter how Congress structures a potential statute, it must be
prepared to submit substantial evidence that there is both a drug problem in
professional sports and that some harm is caused by that problem that
Congress is attempting to stop. In the findings reported in the Clean Sports
Act of 2005, Congress focuses on the use of steroids, not in professional
athletes, but in teenagers. 269 Though the lynchpin of Congress's compelling
governmental interest argument will need to be the effect that professional
drug use has on the youth of America, explained infra, Congress will likely
also need to show that there is a pressing problem of drug use by professional
athletes.270 Mere speculation of drug use will not be enough.271 Congress
should compile a detailed account of both the steroid problem in professional
sports and how that affects the well-documented steroid problem with
teenage athletes.
4. Testing Will Solve the Drug Problem
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Skinner, testing must have a
deterrent effect on drug use in order to be reasonable.272 Similar to the
protocol found constitutional in Skinner, random testing mandated by
Congress would have a deterrent effect on players because players would not
know when they were going to be tested. The effect of a positive test result
would be suspension and loss of pay with the possibility of being banned
from the sport for life.273 With these heavy penalties, avoiding a positive test
would be valuable to an athlete; thus, they would need to avoid steroid use at
all times to ensure they do not test positive.
The bigger question is whether Congress could show that this deterrent
effect on players would have a deterrent effect on steroid use in young adults.
If Congress states its compelling interest in testing professionals as a desire
to stop young people from using steroids, the Court will likely demand a
showing that deterring professionals will deter young people. Congress has
stated that professional athletes have a role model effect on children and
269 S. 1114, § 2(a). Congress found that over 500,000 teenagers have used steroids
or other performance enhancing drugs. Id. § 2(a)(2).
270 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (stressing that, although in all
cases the government may not need to show documented drug abuse problems, such a
showing will "shore up an assertion of special need").
271 See id.
272 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1989).
273 This is assuming Congress imposes the same types of penalties that have been
proposed in previous legislation. See Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong.
§ 4(b)(7) (2005); Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. § 3(a)(5)(A) (2005).
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young adults,274 which was the theory of deterrence used by the school in
Vernonia.2 75 However, in Vernonia, the district court found, and the Supreme
Court accepted, that the athletes were the leaders of the drug culture in the
school, and drug use among others in the school was dependent on athlete
use.276 Congress will need to compile evidence to show that the use of
steroids by. children and young adults is dependent on professional use and,
thus, will be lessened if steroid use is deterred in professional sports.277
5. Balancing the Interest: Can Congress Tip the Scale?
Should Congress construct a statute and compile the evidence stated
above, the Court will still balance the privacy interests of the professional
athletes with the government's asserted compelling interest. The privacy
interests of the players, as stated supra, will be the hardest selling point for
Congress. The Court has upheld urine testing as not excessively invasive
when done in private ways (such as in stalls or when an observer does not
actually watch the urination), 278 which would be the manner in which the
congressional plan would likely operate. But, unlike athletes in a school
environment, professional athletes are not subject to the diminished
expectation of privacy associated with students. To the contrary, professional
athletes are adults working in an industry that is not heavily regulated; thus,
they have the same privacy interests as every other adult in the private sector.
Even if the Court found a diminished privacy interest, Congress would
need to show that it has a governmental interest that is compelling. In its
findings for the Clean Sports Act of 2005, Congress stated its purpose as
"protect[ing] the integrity of professional sports and the health and safety of
athletes generally." 279 Included in protecting the health and safety of athletes
in general is the idea of protecting student athletes from steroid use. This is
evidenced by Congress's extensive findings regarding teen steroid use and
the impact that professional athletes' use has on teens.280 Congress should
274 See Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2005)
("Professional athletes are role models for young athletes and influence the behavior of
children and teenagers.").
275 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,649 (1995).
276 Id.
277 This theory of steroid use in young people is not accepted by everyone. See infra
notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
278 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (stressing that environments for urine collection
that mirrored the common conditions of public restroom use were minimally invasive).
279 S. 1114 § 2(b).
280 See id. § 2(a)(2)-(4). Congress also found in 2005 that 56% of high school
students in 2004 felt that steroids were dangerous, a decrease from 71% in 1992. See
Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to
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approach the testing policy as a way to decrease steroid use in children by
-emphasizing that professionals use steroids and that these professionals act as
'trole models for young athletes and influence the behavior of children and
teenagers." 281 Congress will then have presented a governmental interest that
the Court has already held as compelling: stopping the drug epidemic among
teenagers. 282 Approached in this way, and provided that Congress can
present evidence to support its role-model effect findings, it seems likely the
Court would find the governmental interest compelling.
Without a diminished interest, Congress would have to show that its
governmental interest is "important enough to justify... intrusi[on] upon a
genuine expectation of' full privacy.283 Even with the emphasis the Court
has placed on stopping drug use by students, all attempts to stop such use
have been in the setting of a school, a place where persons being tested do
have a diminished privacy right.284 With the stress the Court has placed on
diminished rights of privacy, this type of showing seems unlikely.
In applying the case law and facts available, Congress's attempt to
mandate testing in professional sports seems to hinge on whether Congress
can convince the Court that professional athletes have a diminished privacy
right. Analyzing the current case law, it appears that such an argument would
be very hard to win; the Court has not yet found a diminished privacy right
outside the public school or heavily regulated industry settings. Because the
Court has never upheld testing in the absence of a diminished privacy right, it
is unlikely that mandated steroid testing would pass constitutional muster.
Part V will discusses what Congress should do to remedy the steroid
problem without the ability to mandate testing in professional sports,
concluding that Congress should focus on increased testing of high school
and middle school students.
V. WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS Do?
Faced with the pressing problem of steroid abuse that current policies
have been ineffective in combating, coupled with a seemingly
insurmountable constitutional hurdle to mandating tougher laws, what should
Congress do to stop the "juicing"? Congress is currently attempting to stop
steroid use in children and young adults by indirectly targeting them.
Eradicate Steroid Use, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Tom Davis, Chairman, House Comm. On Government
Reform).
281 S. 1114 § 2(a)(4).
282 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
2 8 3 Id.
284 See id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832 (2002).
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Congress wants to stop professional athletes from "juicing," hoping the effect
will trickle down to the youth of America. This strategy completely ignores a
solution that could be more effective and would not have to contend with the
constitutional issues raised by mandatory testing for professional athletes:
Congress could directly target steroid use in children. Though Congress may
not want to completely ignore professional use, its focus, and its resources,
should be directly on children. This Part explores ways Congress can directly
target child use of steroids and recommends a way that Congress can still be
involved in the steroid issues facing professional sports organizations.
A. Stopping the "Juicing" in the Youth of America
The actual problem that Congress is attempting to remedy by testing
professional athletes is the use of steroids by children and young athletes.
Congress's ultimate concern, and the central reason it claims to be involved
in the steroid controversy, is the alarming rate of steroid use by the youth of
America.285 However, the current attempts to remedy the situation are
indirect, and thus not effective. 286 The logic Congress is using is that children
use steroids to "be like" their favorite athletes; thus, if the athletes are clean,
then the children will be clean. This ignores the fact that children take
steroids not to "be like" professional athletes, but because they believe that
the success that a professional athlete enjoys is based on steroid use.287 It is
the "skill, power, money, fun and or fame" that causes children to start
"juicing," not a desire to be just like Barry Bonds.288 Congress must
disentangle from the minds of children the idea that steroids are needed to
achieve this success, and simply eliminating steroid use in professional sports
alone will not achieve this. Children must be shown that success can come
without steroid use.289 The best way to disentangle this belief in children and
teenagers is to directly target these groups with the objective of creating an
anti-steroid environment. Congress can do this through increased testing of
285 See Grunbaum et al., supra note 267. See also supra note 267 and accompanying
text.
286 See generally Colin Latiner, Steroids and Drug Enhancements in Sports: The
Real Problem and the Real Solution, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & COMTEMP. PROBS. 192
(2006) (critiquing the ineffective approach Congress has taken to dealing with the steroid
problem).
287 See id. at 214.
2 8 8 Id.
289 Id. ("If what ... kids want is to play at the professional level or dominate at their
current level, and taking steroids seems to them like the only route, then it will not matter
that their favorite sport star is clean of enhancements thanks to a rigorous testing
policy.").
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student athletes in middle school and high school and through educational
programs.
Testing imposed by public school districts has already been held to be
constitutional. 290 Congress should financially support school districts in their
testing efforts. To induce compliance in districts that do not want to test their
athletes, Congress, by using the power of the Spending Clause, 291 could tie
federal educational funding to the implementation of a steroid-testing
protocol, similar to the tying of federal funding to the implementation of
educational testing guidelines described in the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001.292
Congress could go so far as to legislate mandated testing in all middle
school and high schools in the country. 293 As explained in Part IV.B.5, the
only Fourth Amendment hurdle standing between Congress and mandating
testing of professional athletes is the lack of a diminished privacy interest for
professional athletes. Mandating testing for middle school and high school
students does not have this problem; the Court has repeatedly held that public
school students have a diminished privacy interest. 294 With this diminished
right already in place, and the statistics that Congress has already compiled
about the steroid abuse problem in schools, the Court would likely find such
a congressional program constitutional.
No matter which route Congress takes, supporting districts in their own
plans, tying funding to the implementation of a plan, or legislating its own
policy, the policy aimed at teenagers needs to have real consequences. As
explained in Part III.B.4, the deterrent effect of a policy is tied to the
penalties associated with a positive test result. Such penalties should include
suspension from competing in athletics for a significant part of a season, if
not for an entire season, as well as counseling and educational programs
about the dangers of steroids. Students must see a positive test result as
290 See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
291 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
292 The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 requires states to implement a testing
scheme for elementary schools and to post the results in order to receive federal funding.
See generally OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND: A DESKTOP REFERENCE 13-14 (2002), available at http://www.ed.gov/admins/
lead/account/nclbreference/reference.pdf. There are those that claim Congress exceeded
its power in passing the act, and its constitutionality has been challenged See generally,
e.g., Note, Leaving No Child Behind (Except in States that Don't Do as We Say):
Connecticut's Challenge to the Federal Government's Power to Control State Education
Policy Through the Spending Clause, 47 B.C. L. REv. 1033 (2006).
293 Whether Congress has the constitutional ability to pass such legislation under its
Interstate Commerce Clause power is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of
these matters, see Mitten, supra note 39.
2 94 See supra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
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detracting from their ability to be successful and achieve the skill, power,
money, fun, and/or fame that they desire. Missing a significant amount of
time from a sport can damage a player's chance to move on to the next level
of her desired sport.295 Once the disentanglement of steroids with success
occurs, the incentive to use steroids will disappear.
This testing program should be coupled with educational programs
informing young people not only of the dangers of steroid use, but. that
steroid use is decreasing and steroid-positive tests have consequences. The
latter two will help to show students that steroids are not needed for success
and will actually hamper a student's ability to be successful. If no one in their
generation is using steroids, then the need for steroids to take the next step
will diminish; the students that they are competing with will also be steroid-
free. When students are armed with this information, the belief that steroids
are needed for success will begin to diminish.
If Congress places its efforts in this arena, by supplying financial backing
for testing programs and educational programs in schools, the use of steroids
by professionals can be counter-balanced. With enough time, education, and
testing, child use of steroids can hopefully be extinguished. The success of
these steroid-free children will follow them into the ranks of professional
sports, and the use of steroids in that arena will likewise decrease and
ultimately disappear. In this way, professional sports will slowly be purged
of the current addiction to steroid use, while protecting those that Congress is
particularly worried about: children.
B. Stopping "Juicing" at the Professional Level
Though professional sports can be purged of steroids over time with
direct efforts to stop steroid use amongst middle school and high school
students, Congress still has an option to attack steroid use in professional
sports today. Congress can place in the tax code incentives for professional
sports organizations and owners of teams to meet minimum steroid-testing
and punishment standards. In this way, Congress is not mandating drug
testing, nor causing testing by compulsion. 296 The professional organizations
295 When looking at students for college or the professional ranks, scouts often look
to the total statistics athletes have compiled during their careers as well as the character
of the student. See Athletes, Coaches, Umpires, and Related Workers, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos251.pdf (last
visited Apr. 20, 2008). These statistics will take a hit if a student misses a significant
amount of time from a sport, and the character of a student would be called into question
if his or her record shows a positive steroid test. Both of these elements would decrease
the chance of success for a student with a positive steroid test.
296 Testing done by compulsion of sovereign authority is state action, even if done
by a private party, and invokes Fourth Amendment protection. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor
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and owners can choose whether to take advantage of the tax break, keeping
the decision to test purely a private one. 297 There would be no state action
involved, and the policy would satisfy the demands of the Fourth
Amendment.298
A tax incentive scheme would likely appeal to organizations that have
allowed steroid use to proliferate because it increases revenues. 299 If it
becomes more profitable to have stricter testing policies than to allow steroid
use to continue at the current rate, a push for stricter testing will occur.
Though players' unions will likely still lobby against strict policies, 300 there
will now be an incentive for the owners/organization side of the bargaining
table to push back, something that has been lacking in the past.30 1 This extra
push may be enough to bring these policies up to the level that Congress is
seeking.
VI. CONCLUSION
Steroid use is a pressing problem-not just in professional sports, but,
more importantly, in the arena of children and teenagers. In order to solve the
problem of "juicing," Congress has looked exclusively at stopping "juicing"
among professional athletes, 302 hoping that this will stop the "juicing" of
children, the purported real concern. However, mandating steroid testing for
professional athletes poses a constitutional hurdle: the Fourth Amendment.30 3
This is a hurdle that, given current Supreme Court jurisprudence, Congress is
unlikely to clear.304
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). The Court held that the private party, a
railroad company, had to comply with the regulations set down by a government entity; it
was compelled to test in order to comply with the regulation. See id. In the case of a tax
incentive, there is no compulsion. A private party does not have to take advantage of the
tax benefit, but rather, the party chooses to take advantage of it by implementing the
testing protocol. In this way Congress is not compelling any action by the private party,
and any action taken remains purely private.
297 Testing done purely by a private party, "on his own initiative," does not have to
meet the demands of the Constitution. See id.
298 See id.
2 99 See supra Part III.A.
300 The incentives for players to want weak testing policies, explained supra Part III,
would still be in place under this system.
301 Id.
302 See, e.g., Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005) (only regulating
professional athletes).
303 See supra Part IV.
304 See supra Part IV.B.5.
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This inability to mandate testing in professional sports may actually be a
positive for solving the overall problem. Because Congress can do less in the
professional arena, it should shift the focus to an area it can more easily
regulate-the behavior of our children. 30 5 By supporting or mandating
testing of young people, coupled with educational programs and strict
penalties, Congress can begin fighting the problem directly instead of hewing
to the indirect method it is currently pursuing. This direct assault will have
much quicker and long-lasting results than just targeting professionals, and
can ensure that the next generation of athletes plays the game steroid-free.
305 See supra Part V; see also Latiner, supra note 286, at 214.
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